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Abstract
This paper presents experimental evidence on the effects of minimum
bids in ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auctions.  The auction experiments
manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the Internet for
collectible trading cards from the game Magic: the Gathering.  They
yielded data on a number of economic outcomes, including the  number
of participating bidders, the probability of sale, the levels of individual
bids, and the auctioneer’s revenues.  The benchmark theoretical model
tested here is the classic auction model described by Riley and
Samuelson (1981), with symmetric, risk-neutral bidders with
independent private values.  The data  verify a number of the predictions
of the  theory.  A particularly interesting result shows that many bidders
behave strategically, anticipating the effects of the reserve price on
others’ bids.
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1 Introduction
There has been considerable theoretical work on the effects of minimum bids (or reserve pric-
es) in auctions, but the empirical literature on auctions has so far failed to test any of this theory.
This paper represents a ﬁrst attempt to ﬁll this gap.  I report experimental tests of  the theory of
reserve prices in ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auctions, using a methodological innovation: the ability to
run “ﬁeld experiments” in a preexisting market.  The  experimental data verify the basic predictions
of the theoretical model developed by Vickrey (1961) and extended by Riley and Samuelson
(1981).  In particular, the bidders exhibit sophisticated strategic reactions to changes in reserve
prices, as predicted by the theory.  In addition, I present empirical results on the relationship be-
tween the mean revenues and the minimum-bid level.
Empirical studies of auctions can be divided into two distinct groups: laboratory experiments
and ﬁeld-data studies.  Dozens of laboratory experiments have tested different predictions of auc-
tion theory; for a comprehensive review, see Kagel (1995).  Empirical work using ﬁeld data, such
as that from government auctions for offshore oil rights, has been more limited in its ability to test
theory, because of data restrictions.  Hendricks and Paarsch (1995) provide an excellent summary
of this literature.  The present study’s methodology is a hybrid between that of the laboratory and
that of traditional ﬁeld research; hence the term “ﬁeld experiment.”  In Lucking-Reiley (1999), I
used a similar methodology to test predicted  equivalences between auction formats.
To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical study, from either the laboratory or the ﬁeld, to
measure the effects of minimum bid levels.1  I ﬁnd conﬁrmation of several basic predictions of auc-
1  Earlier papers by McAfee, Quan, and Vincent (1995) and by Paarsch (1997) concern themselves with re-
serve prices, and both contain empirical work (one on real estate auctions, and the other on timber auctions).
These papers both make normative predictions, using data on empirical auction outcomes in order to predict op-
timal reserve prices for the auctioneer.  By contrast, my paper investigates a positive question: do reserve prices
result in the effects predicted by theory?- 3 - - 3 -
tion theory: increasing the reserve price decreases the number of bids received and the probability
of selling the good, and increases auction revenue for goods which are actually sold.  Perhaps most
interesting is the result that that bidders react strategically to the existence of reserve prices, just as
predicted by Bayesian Nash equilibrium theory.  
The paper is organized as follows.   Section 2 reviews the empirically testable implications of
the theory of reserve prices in auctions,  based mainly on Riley and Samuelson (1981). Section 3
describes the history and institutional details of the marketplace where these ﬁeld experiments took
place.  Section 4 describes in detail the two experimental designs used in this study, along with a
demographic description of the experimental subjects.  Section 5 describes the results of the exper-
iments, and the paper concludes with a brief summary and suggestions for future research.
2 Theoretical Background
There is a large theoretical literature on reserve prices in auctions (see Wilson (1992) and McA-
fee and McMillan (1987a)), but little of it focuses on empirically testable predictions.  In this sec-
tion, I review the testable implications of the earliest and simplest model of auctions, due to Vickrey
(1961), which assumes independent private values (IPV)2 and an exogenous number of bidders.3 I
do this because of the simplicity of the model, for which the implications of reserve prices were
ﬁrst considered in detail by Riley and Samuelson (1981).  Although more general models are avail-
able, I focus on this classic model as a ﬁrst step in the empirical investigation of the effects of re-
2  Many recent theories of auctions have focused on the more general afﬁliated-values model proposed by Mil-
grom and Weber (1982), where individuals’ values for the good may be privately uncertain, with signals of uncer-
tain value that are correlated among bidders.  For a theory of reserve prices in an auction with afﬁliated values, see
Levin and Smith (1996).
3  Samuelson (1985), Levin and Smith (1996), and McAfee, Quan, and Vincent (1995) present models of auc-
tioneers’ reserve prices in auctions with an endogenous number of bidders.  In such models, bidding is costly, and
therefore bidders must decide whether or not to participate.  Lucking-Reiley (1999b) uses experimental data to
examine the assumptions of such models.- 4 - - 4 -
serve prices, to examine the basic model’s predictive power.   Future studies may be able to deter-
mine under what circumstances, if any, more complicated models manage to perform better than
the simple one.
In the model of Riley and Samuelson (1981), the effects of reserve prices are relatively straight-
forward.  Setting an optimal reserve price allows the auctioneer to use his bargaining power to ex-
tract a bit of additional proﬁt from the highest bidder, above and beyond the proﬁts which would
result merely from competition between bidders.  In effect, a minimum bid represents a take-it-or-
leave-it offer from the auctioneer to the highest bidder.4
  If N bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from a distribution function with CDF F(v),
and if the auctioneer holds a ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auction with reserve price r, then the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium to the bidding game involves each bidder submitting a bid according to the fol-
lowing bid function:
(1)
We can also consider the impact of the reserve price r on the auctioneer’s revenue.5  The ex-
pected revenue R(r) to the auctioneer is equal to the expected value of the bid of the bidder with
4  In some auctions, instead of announcing a minimum bid from the beginning, the auctioneer may instead use
an implicit, or secret, reserve price.  In such cases, the highest bidder still wins the item only if he exceeds the
amount of the reserve, though he does not know in advance what this reserve price is.
5  I focus on revenues instead of auctioneer proﬁts, which are identical to revenues only in the case where the
auctioneer has zero salvage value for the goods.  Although proﬁts are more meaningful to an auctioneer, I focus
instead on revenues because of their easy measurability.  Computing expected proﬁts would require me to estimate
my own salvage value for the goods, which is hard to do in an objective manner.
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the highest valuation for the good.  Riley and Samuelson (1981) derived the following expression
for this quantity:
(2)
For example, suppose that bidders’ valuations are distributed according to a uniform distribu-
tion on [0,1].  Then the bid function is:
(3)
Figure 1 illustrates this function for the cases N=2 and N=5.  In each case, two lines are dis-
played: one for an absolute auction (that is, r=0), and one for an auction with reserve price r=0.5.
With zero reserve, the bid function is linear with slope equal to (N-1)/N, increasing in the number
of bidders. With reserve price r>0, a bidder submits no bid unless his value v exceeds r, in which
case he bids on a nonlinear curve whose slope is again increasing in the number of bidders.  Fur-
thermore, this curve lies above the zero-reserve bid function for all valuations v³r.
The auctioneer’s expected revenue, from equation 2, is given by:
(4)
 Figure 2 illustrates the expected revenue function R(r) for the cases N=2 and N=5.6  Each curve
increases to a maximum at r=0.5, and then falls off rapidly.  The optimal reserve price r=0.5 is in-
dependent of the number of bidders.7  Each curve begins ﬂat at r=0, as   for all N,8 and
6  For the case N=5, the expected revenue varies only slightly in r.  To illustrate the optimum, the ﬁgure in-
cludes a close-up of the N=5 curve over a very small segment of the vertical axis.
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remains ﬂat longer when the number of bidders is larger.  (The N=2 curve begins to increase much
earlier than does the N=5 curve, which is peaked only locally around r=0.5.) Furthermore, the gains
to setting an optimal reserve price become very small as N increases.  As the reserve price increases
from zero to its optimal value, auction revenue increases by 25 percent when N=2, but only by 0.78
percent when N=5.  Intuitively, as N increases beyond 2, competition between bidders creates high
rent extraction for the auctioneer, which begins to swamp the revenue effect of the reserve price.
As a second example, I consider bidder valuations drawn independently from an exponential
distribution with parameter b=1.  This example is interesting because, unlike the uniform distribu-
tion, the exponential distribution has no upper bound on valuations.  Figure 3 displays the bid func-
tions for both N=2 and N=5, for the cases r=0 and r=1.  Figure 4 displays the revenue curve R(r)
for both N=2 and N=5.  The exponential example is similar to the uniform example in several re-
spects.  Again, the presence of a positive reserve price screens out bidders whose valuations lie be-
low the reserve price, but strictly increases the bids of bidders whose valuations lie above the re-
serve price.  The expected-revenue curve increases to its maximum at r=1, an optimal reserve in-
7  The fact that the optimal reserve level is independent of the number of bidders turns out to be a general result
of the IPV model, for any value distribution F(v), as proven by Riley and Samuelson (1981).  The result follows
directly from differentiating  equation 2 with respect to r, using Leibniz’ rule:
.
Setting this expression equal to zero yields an expression for the optimal reserve price that is independent of
the number of bidders.   This may or may not be a global optimum, depending on the distribution of values F(v).
The revenue curve has a unique optimum if and only if the equation vF’(v) + F(v) - 1 = 0 has only one root.  This
is satisﬁed for any distribution with a monotone hazard rate, which is a condition often assumed for convenience
by theorists.
8  This result is not unique to the assumption of a uniform distribution of bidder valuations.  Although I have
not seen it proved previously, it is a general result of the independent-private-values model.  The only assumption
required is that there must not be a mass point at zero in the probability distribution of valuations: F(0)=0.  Taking
the equation in footnote 8 and evaulating it at r=0, one obtains:
.
Therefore,   at r=0, and so long as F(0) is not equal to zero or one, the inequality is strict.
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dependent of the number of bidders, and falls off more rapidly to the right of the maximum.  The
curve begins ﬂat at  r=0.  Finally, the gains to setting an optimal reserve price fall off rapidly with
larger N, from 33.6 percent at N=2 to 1.9 percent at N=5.
There are also a few differences between the two examples.  First, the decline in expected ev-
enue beyond the optimal reserve price is more gradual in the case of the exponential distribution,
which has an inﬁnite support and therefore some nonzero probability of sale no matter how large
the reserve price.  By contrast, with the uniform distribution the expected revenue must go to zero
at r=1, because there is zero probability that any bidder will value the good at v³1.  Second, the
gains to be had with an optimal reserve price are more substantial (in percentage terms) under the
exponential distribution, and  do not dissipate quite so quickly with increased N.
Having illustrated the model with some examples, I now summarize its general predictions
about the effects of a reserve price.  The most basic predictions are that increasing the reserve price
should (1) reduce the number of bidders who submit bids, by screening out those bidders with low
valuations, (2) reduce the probability of the good’s being sold, and (3) increase the revenue earned
on a good, conditional on its being sold.  A fourth, more subtle prediction depends on the presence
of strategic behavior by bidders: that b(v;r+ r) > b(v;r) for all v>r+ r, or that an increase in the
reserve price will cause a strict increase in the bid for a given bidder.  We see this in ﬁgures 1 and
3, where the dotted line (positive reserve price) is strictly above the solid line (zero reserve price)
for all valuations above the reserve.  Intuitively, in Bayesian Nash equilibrium a bidder realizes that
an increase in the reserve price will increase the bids of the other bidders who choose to remain in
the auction, and therefore will increase his own optimal bid level as well.  Fifth, the auctioneer’s
revenue curve should be ﬂat at r=0,9 and either ﬂat or positively sloped for all reserve prices r less
9  Footnote 8 shows that this is true unless there is a mass point of bidders with zero valuation, which seems
unlikely.  A person who values the good at zero, should probably not be considered one of the N potential bidders.- 8 - - 8 -
than the optimal reserve price.10  Finally, the examples show that we might expect the revenue
curve to be more steeply sloped to the right of the optimal reserve than it is to the left of the optimal
reserve, as expected revenues fall off sharply with the reduced probability of sale.
3 Institutional Background
My experiments involve auctions of collectible cards from the game Magic: the Gathering, a
game whose retail success is a story in itself.11  This product grossed hundreds of millions of retail
dollars and boasted over a million players worldwide within three years of its introduction in 1993.
The game features well over a thousand distinct types of cards, each of which plays a slightly dif-
ferent role, sold in random assortments at a variety of retail stores.
Well before the popularity of the World Wide Web and of auction sites such as eBay,12 an online
marketplace had already developed for Magic cards.  Initially, Magic players developed the Inter-
net newsgroup <rec.games.deckmaster> to discuss game play and strategies.  Buy, sell, and trade
offers for individual cards soon appeared there, with individuals agreeing to terms of trade via
email, and cards delivered via postal mail.  Messages devoted to economic trades soon over-
whelmed the discussion, so within a few months a second newsgroup was dedicated exclusively to
the trading of these cards.  In the spring of 1995, the marketplace newsgroup had nearly 6,000 mes-
sages posted each week, making it the highest-volume newsgroup on the entire Internet.13
Some individuals posted lists of cards they were willing to trade, along with “wish lists” of
cards they would be willing to accept in return, and solicited responses by private electronic mail.
10  This assumes that the distribution of values is such that the expected-revenue function has a unique local
maximum, a condition often assumed for convenience by auction theorists.
11  This retail success has since been eclipsed by a newer product from the same manufacturer, Wizards of the
Coast.  Readers with children will likely recognize the Pokémon trading-card game, introduced in early 1999.
12  See Lucking-Reiley (2000) for a survey of various online-auction Web sites.
13  Source: Top 40 Newsgroups in Order by Trafﬁc Volume, April 1995.- 9 - - 9 -
Others post ﬁxed prices at which they are willing to sell cards for cash.  Many sellers conducted
auctions of their unwanted cards, using a variety of different auction mechanisms.  Most auctions
were English ascending-bid auctions, but Dutch and ﬁrst-price auctions could also be found.  Some
auctioneers speciﬁed nonzero minimum bids, while others did not. 
This marketplace represented a real-world laboratory for the testing of auction theory.  Labo-
ratory experiments, which to date have provided the majority of data on bidders' behavior in auc-
tions, have occasionally been criticized on the grounds that subjects' behavior in an artiﬁcial labo-
ratory environment may not be exactly the same as their behavior would be in the “real world.”  The
Magic card market provided the opportunity to run controlled experimental auctions in the ﬁeld
rather than in the laboratory.14  Since in any given week there were dozens of auctioneers holding
Magic auctions on the Internet, an experimenter could be a “small player” who did not signiﬁcantly
perturb the overall market.15
One of the strengths of this study is its subject pool.  The bidders in these experiments had di-
verse demographic backgrounds,16 but shared an intense interest in the auctioned items, making
them representative subjects for a test of auction theory.  Indeed, the trading of Magic cards has
become just as enthralling an activity for some people as the actual playing of the game, in part
because enjoyment of the game depends critically on the composition of one’s deck.  A player will
14  Of course, this also meant giving up some of the useful controls of the laboratory environment.  For exam-
ple, I could not observe the bidders’ valuations or ensure common knowledge of the number of bidders or the dis-
tribution of values.  In a ﬁeld experiment, one cannot verify many of the underlying assumptions of a theory;
instead one checks whether the predictions of the theory hold true in a messy, real-world environment.
15  This technique of running ﬁeld experiments can also have a ﬁnancial advantage over traditional laboratory
techniques.  Since real people actually demand the goods being auctioned in the experiments,  the experimenter
need not pay the traditional monetary inducement to get subjects to participate.  A typical laboratory experiment
might cost $2000 in payments to 40 or 50 subjects.  By contrast, the within-card experiments described below in-
volved purchasing cards for about $1600 and selling them for about $2000, realizing a $400 gross proﬁt. (Proﬁts
on the between-card experiments are difﬁcult to calculate, because they involved selling only portions of larger
sets of cards I purchased.)
16  For more detailed demographic information about the bidders, see my doctoral dissertation (Reiley (1996),
available on request).  The bidders, from all over the United States and several foreign countries, included college
students, professional engineers, government employees, and military personnel.- 10 - - 10 -
typically own several different decks, each of which has been designed for speciﬁc game strategies.
Many Magic enthusiasts also collect the cards as one might collect baseball cards, so a particular
card might ﬁne-tune one player’s deck, or complete part of another player’s collection.  Scarcity is
one major determinant of transaction prices for cards, as some cards have been designated “rare”
(versus merely “uncommon” or “common”), and some cards were printed in limited editions.  This
research project used only limited-edition cards.
One trader wrote an automated computer program to search the marketplace newsgroup for
each instance of each card name (with some tolerance for misspellings) and gather data on the pric-
es posted next to each card name in the newsgroup messages.  It was designed to compute trimmed
means, standard deviations, quantiles, and so on, automatically placing these data on the Internet
for interested parties to read.  The Cloister price list, as it became known, was recomputed each
week, with each week's list archived for public use.  Each card’s price on the list represents the
trimmed mean of hundreds (or thousands) of individual observations.  Such observations may have
come from auctions in progress (perhaps with low opening prices), from consummated trades, or
from advertised prices too high to actually result in trades.  Despite the variability of the underlying
observations, a number of people found the trimmed-mean Cloister prices to be a reliable measure
of card value: I frequently observed traders using the Cloister list as their standard price refer-
ence.17  I make considerable use of these Cloister prices in this paper.
17   It is commonly believed that the existence of potential resale value (as is the case with Magic cards) au-
tomatically implies that bidder valuations have a common-value component, rather than having independent pri-
vate values (IPV).  However,  recent theoretical work by Haile (1999) formally demonstrates that this need not be
the case.  Furthermore, many of the bidders in Magic card auctions are primarily interested in the cards for their
own use, rather than for resale value.  Some individuals will have intense intrinsic desires for speciﬁc cards, want-
ing them for a speciﬁc deck strategy or a particular collection.  Cards are available for sale at a variety of sources
(friends, card stores, Internet auctions, etc.), with considerable price dispersion across sellers.  Because  people
have different access to information on card prices, and different values for the amount of time it takes to search
for a bargain, we might realistically expect the effective valuation for the good, a “valuation net of search cost,”
to vary from bidder to bidder.  For these reasons, the IPV model seems a plausible approximation to the truth.- 11 - - 11 -
4 Experimental Procedure
Two distinct experimental designs are used in this paper.  The ﬁrst examines the effects of a
binary variable: whether or not minimum bids were used.  By auctioning the same cards twice,
once with and once without minimum bids, the design exploits within-card variation to ﬁnd the ef-
fects of the treatment variable on bidding behavior.  The second design investigates the effects of
a continuous variable: the reserve price level (expressed as a fraction of the Cloister reference
price).  The across-card variation provides information that can be used to test predictions about
the shape of the revenue curve R(r) as a function of the reserve price level.
4.1 Within-Card Experiments
The ﬁrst part of the data collection consisted of two pairs of auctions.  Each of the four auctions
was a sealed-bid, ﬁrst-price auction of several dozen individual Magic cards.  This simultaneous
auction of many different goods at once, although not  common in other economic environments,18
was the norm for Magic card auctions on the Internet.  Running auctions in this simultaneous-auc-
tion format thus made the experiment as realistic and natural as possible for the bidders, who saw
many other similar auctions in the Internet marketplace for cards.
Each auction lasted one week, from the time the auction was announced to the deadline by
which all bids had to be received.  I announced each auction to potential bidders via two channels.
First, I posted three announcements to the appropriate Internet newsgroup.  For each auction, I
posted a total of three newsgroup messages spaced evenly over the course of the week of the auc-
tion.  Second, I solicited some bidders directly via email messages to their personal electronic mail-
18  Although simultaneous auctions are not traditional for familiar auctions, such as those of art, estate goods,
or tulip bulbs, such formats have been used for timber and offshore oil auctions.  The advent of computerized bid-
ding appear to be making the simultaneous auction format even more common.  In addition to the card auctions
(and auctions for other goods) taking place on the Internet, a simultaneous-auction format was used for the recent
FCC auctions of spectrum rights.  See McMillan (1994) for details.- 12 - - 12 -
boxes.  My mailing list for direct solicitation was comprised of people who had already demon-
strated their interest in participating in auctions for Magic cards by participation in previous ones.
The paired-auction experiment proceeded as follows.  First, I held a zero-minimum-bid auction
for 86 different cards (one of each card in the Antiquities expansion set).  The subject line of the
announcement read “Reiley's Auction #4: ANTIQUITIES, 5 Cent Minimum, Free Shipping!” so
that potential bidders might be attracted by the unusually low (essentially zero) minimum bid per
card.19  After the one-week deadline for submitting bids had passed, I identiﬁed the highest bid on
each card.  To each bidder who had won one or more cards, I emailed a bill for the total amount
owed.20  After receiving a winner’s payment via check or money order, I mailed them their cards.21
I also emailed a list of the winning bids to each bidder who had participated in the auction,
whether or not they had won cards, as an attempt to maintain my reputation as a credible auctioneer.
I did not give the bidders any explicit information about the number of people who had participated
in the auction, or about the number of people who had received email invitations to participate.22
19  A 5-cent minimum is effectively no minimum, since the auction rules required all bids to be in integer mul-
tiples of a nickel.
20  Although the standard practice in this marketplace is for auctioneers and other card sellers to charge buyers
for postage and/or handling, I did not do so.  I wanted bidders to bid independently, as much as possible, on each
of the cards in which they were interested.  Someone seriously interested in one card might decide to bid higher
on a second card in the same auction than they would if the cards were auctioned independently, in order to spread
out the postage costs per card by purchasing more than one card simultaneously from the same source.  In addition,
some of the cards I auctioned had rather low values, and I wanted to avoid having the card values be swamped by
the cost of shipping.  For example, if a bidder won a single card for 20 cents and then had to pay a ﬁxed 50-cent
shipping charge on top of that, the amount of useful information which could be derived from her bid would be
rather suspect.  Therefore, in the interests of keeping bid data as clean as possible, I decided to pay postage costs
myself, and announced in advance that ﬁrst-class shipping was included in the amount of each bid.
21  A small number of winning bidders failed to pay for the cards they had won.  In all, I received payment for
90 percent of the cards sold, constituting 89 percent of the reported revenue in the within-card auctions.  Almost
all of the “deadbeat” bidders were those who won only a single card, and who explained that they had originally
hoped to win more cards, and didn’t feel it was worth it to complete the transaction.  I discouraged such behavior,
but was unable to eliminate it.  Out of 170 winning bidders in the eight auctions, only eight individuals won mul-
tiple cards but failed to pay for them.  Since none of the unpaid cards seemed to have outlandishly high winning
bid amounts, I have adopted the belief that all bids were made in good faith, and have therefore not excluded any
observations from the analysis.
22  See Reiley (1996) for more details on the demographics of the bidders and the numbers of cards won by
each bidder in the auctions.- 13 - - 13 -
After one additional week of buffer time after the end of the ﬁrst auction, I ran the second auc-
tion in the paired experiment, this time with reasonably high minimum bid levels on each of the
same 86 cards as before.  The minimum bid levels were determined by consulting the standard
(trimmed-mean) Cloister price list of Magic cards cited in section 3 of this paper, and setting the
minimum bid level for each card equal to 90 percent of that card’s price-list value.
This contrast in minimum bid levels (zero versus 90 percent of the Cloister price list) was the
key difference between the two auctions.23  By keeping other conditions identical between the two
auctions, I attempted to isolate the effects of minimum bids on potential bidders' behavior.  One
condition that could not be kept identical, unfortunately, was the time period during which the auc-
tion took place.  Because the two auctions took place two weeks apart, there were potential differ-
ences between them that might have affected bidder behavior.  First, the demands for the cards (or
the supplies by other auctioneers) might have changed systematically over time, which is a realistic
possibility in such a fast-changing market as this one.24  Second, the results of the ﬁrst auction may
have affected the demand for the cards sold in the second auction.25
To control for such potential variations in conditions over time, I simultaneously ran the same
experiment in reverse order, using a different sample of cards.  This second pair of auctions each
featured the 78 cards in the Arabian Nights expansion set, with minimum bids present in the ﬁrst
23  Both auctions lasted exactly seven days.  The same 86 cards were up for bid in each auction.  Each auction
announcement was posted exactly three times to the marketplace newsgroup, and was emailed to the same list of
potential bidders (except for bidders who asked to have their names removed, and did not bid in either auction).
Even the subject line of the announcements and mailings was identical, except that in the second auction, the
words “5 Cent Minimum” were removed.
24  For example, certain cards from the Arabian Nights expansion set increased in value by a factor of ten dur-
ing their ﬁrst year out of print.  It turns out that market prices for cards were actually rather stable during the month
in which this experiment was conducted, but I did not know ex ante what was going to happen to card prices.
25  For example, suppose that Jane Bidder is very anxious to obtain a Guardian Beast card for her deck, so that
her valuation of the card is much higher than that of any of the other bidders in the experiment.  She then wins the
card in the ﬁrst auction, and then has zero demand for that same card in the second auction, since she only really
wants one copy.  If this is generally the case for most cards, that the highest-value bidders in the sample are
screened out in the ﬁrst auction, then we might expect to see systematically lower revenues in the second auction.- 14 - - 14 -
auction but absent in the second.  Just as before, minimum bids were set at 90 percent of the market
price level from the Cloister price list.  The ﬁrst auction in this pair began three days after the start
of the ﬁrst auction in the previous pair, so that the auctions in the two experiments overlapped in
time but were offset by three days.  I used a larger mailing list for my email announcement in this
pair of auctions (232 people) than I had for the previous pair of auctions (50 people), with the ﬁrst
mailing list being a subset of the second mailing list.26  Also, the Arabian Nights cards in the sec-
ond pair (median reserve price $8.36) were more valuable than the Antiquities cards used in the
ﬁrst pair (median reserve price $4.41).  Otherwise, all other conditions were identical between the
two pairs of auctions.  A sample auction announcement is displayed in the Appendix.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for each of the four auctions in the within-card experi-
ments.27 For ease of reference, I introduce two-letter mnemonics for each auction.   The ﬁrst letter
represents the card set: A for Antiquities, B for Arabian Nights.  The second letter is A for an ab-
solute auction (reserve prices equal to zero), and R for an auction with positive reserve prices. In
the table, the auctions are displayed in two pairs: ﬁrst Auctions AA and AR, for the 86 Antiquities
cards, and then  Auctions BA and BR, for the 78 Arabian Nights cards.28  Auctions AA and BA
were “absolute auctions” (no minimum bids), while Auctions AR and BR had sizable minimums .
26  I added a large number of names to my mailing list between the A pair of auctions and the B pair of auctions
when a new list of names became available to me; it was important to me (for both ﬁnancial and experimental
reasons) to maintain a large number of participating bidders.   Many of the additions to my list turned out not be
interested in my auctions; they were subsequently dropped from the list (see footnote 29).  The number of invited
bidders was not a variable of primary interest in this study.
27  These auctions were part of a series of auctions run for a larger research program, so participating bidders
saw me run several other auctions (not part of the research presented here) during this same time period.  This had
two advantages.  First, it helped avoid drawing bidders’ attention to the point of my research.  (For example, during
this time period I also ran an English auction, a second-price auction, and another ﬁrst-price auction, with different
sets of cards.)  I feared that if they knew I was looking for the effects of reserve prices, it might distort their be-
havior (for example, they might consciously try to bid consistently from one auction to another).  Second, it had
the effect of making bidders unsure what I would do next.  In particular, I didn’t want bidders to expect that I would
always auction the same card twice, for it might distort their behavior if they knew they would have a second
chance to bid on the same card.
28  A few of the auction items I denote as “cards” were actually groups of cards: either a sealed pack of out-
of-print cards, or a set of common cards bundled together.- 15 - - 15 -
The table includes descriptive statistics on the number of participating bidders, the number of
bids received, and the total payments received from winning bidders.  Note two key points.  First,
“real money” was involved in the auction transactions.  Of the 73 different bills I sent to winning
bidders over the course of the experiment, the median payment amount for each auction was be-
tween $10 and $24.  A few individual payments  exceeded $100.  Second, in each auction there are
multiple winning bidders.  The number of winning bidders in each auction ranges from 6 to 27, and
the fraction of bidders who win at least one card is between 40 percent and 86 percent.  In each
auction, the median number of cards won by each winner is between 2 and 3.5, while the maximum
number of cards won by a single bidder ranges from 12 to 26.  Except in Auction AR, no winner
won more than 29 percent of the cards sold in any single auction.   (In Auction AR, participation
was very low: only 7 people submitted bids, 6 of whom won at least one card, and 39 of the cards
went unsold.)  The biggest spender in any of the auctions won cards totalling $316.50 of the total
revenue of $774.75 in Auction BA, generating 41 percent of the revenue despite winning no more
than 15 percent of the cards - evidently, she was particularly interested in high-value cards.  Thus,
it is not the case that one person is the highest bidder on all cards in an auction, suggesting that a
given bidder’s valuations for different cards are at least somewhat independent.  This provides
some justiﬁcation for the statistical results below in which each individual card bid is assumed to
be an independent observation.
4.2 Between-Card Experiments
A second set of experiments was designed to examine the effects of changes in the level of the
reserve price, rather than merely changes in the existence of reserve prices.  Four ﬁrst-price, sealed-
bid auctions took place, each with a one-week timeframe for the submission of bids.  Each was a
simultaneous auction of 99 different items, this time with no overlap of items between auctions,- 16 - - 16 -
and each card had a posted reserve price.  Just as before, each auction was announced via three
posts to the relevant newsgroup, as well as via email to a list of bidders.29
I set the reserve price for each card as a particular fraction of the current Cloister price of that
card.  In each of the ﬁrst two auctions, nine cards were auctioned at a minimum bid of 10 percent
of the Cloister price, nine at 20 percent, nine at 30 percent, and so on, up to a maximum of 110
percent of the Cloister price.  After noticing interesting results in these two auctions both at rela-
tively low and at relatively high reserve price levels, I decided  to increase the number of such ob-
servations in these regions in the two subsequent auctions.   Therefore, the third and fourth auctions
auctioned equal numbers of cards at reserve levels of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140,
and 150 percent of the Cloister price.30
This variation in reserve price levels was designed to investigate how both bidder behavior and
expected auction revenue would react to changes in the reserve price, and to calculate the revenue-
maximizing reserve price level.  Normalizing by the Cloister price, since this is a standard refer-
ence price computed in the same way for all Magic cards, makes cross-card comparisons feasible.
Besides the exceptions noted above, all experimental protocols and bidder instructions were kept
identical to those in the auctions with reserve prices described in section 4.1.
Summary statistics for the between-card auctions are given in Table 4.  Reserve prices ranged
from 10 percent to 150 percent of each individual card’s Cloister value; the average reserve price
level varied slightly from auction to auction, from 60 percent to 85 percent.  Each auction had doz-
29  For this series of auctions, the bidder pool was larger than before.  As described in footnote 26, I added
new bidders to my mailing list over the course of the research program (by contrast, within any single experiment
I tried to hold the potential bidder pool constant).  Auction R1’s announcement was emailed to 531 individuals.
Because some people speciﬁcally requested to be removed from my mailing list, the total dropped to 489 individ-
uals by the time Auction R4 began.
30  In my haste to run these follow-up auctions, I made some errors in computing the minimum bid levels, so
these numbers were not quite equal in practice.  Some cards were mistakenly assigned reserve levels of 60 percent
and 90 percent in these auctions, but this does not compromise the integrity of the data.- 17 - - 17 -
ens of bidders and hundreds of bids on individual cards.  The number of people receiving email
invitations to participate declined with each successive auction, but only due to recipients asking
to be removed from my mailing list, so the changes in the mailing list should not have affected the
number of interested participants.  The data from the between-card auctions are not directly com-
parable to that those the within-card auctions, because the size and composition of the pool of par-
ticipating bidders  changed considerably during the intervening six months.  Very few bidders over-
lapped between the two experiments; most of the bidders in the between-card experiment were new
recruits.  Table 4 also displays some aggregate statistics on revenue, including the total Cloister val-
ue of all the cards in each auction and the total revenue earned on cards sold.  The four auctions
generated  revenues reasonably close to the total Cloister value of the cards, with only 13 percent
of the cards going unsold.
5 Results
In the ﬁrst subsection below, I consider two of the most basic predictions of the theory: whether
the number or bids and the probability of sale both decline with the reserve price.  In the second
subsection, I examine whether a reserve price increases revenues conditional on a sale, and then
consider the effects on unconditional expected revenues.  Finally, I test the prediction that bidders
ought to react strategically to reserve prices,anticipating the effects on their rivals bids.
5.1 Number of bids and probability of sale
In the theoretical model, higher reserve prices ought to reduce both the number of bidders and
the probability of selling the item, because they screen out low-value bidders.  These predictions
are very basic, because they do not require bidders to act strategically; they require only that bid-
ders participate at low reserve prices but stop participating at higher reserve prices.  Note that while- 18 - - 18 -
we would expect these predictions to be satisﬁed in most economic models of bidding, it is also
possible to imagine the predictions being violated.  For example, some bidders might choose not
to bid in auctions where the reserve prices are too low, if they assume that none of the items were
valuable enough to be worth bothering with.  Data have not previously been available to test even
these most basic predictions about reserve prices, so this is an important place to begin.
In the within-card experiment, the number of bids declined measurably with the imposition of
reserve prices, as shown in Table 1. In experiment A, the imposition of nonzero minimum bids re-
duced the number of participating bidders from 19 to 7, and the number of individual card bids
from 565 to 71.  Similarly, the imposition of minimum bids in experiment B lowered the number
of participating bidders from 62 to 42, and the number of submitted bids from 1583 to 238.  In both
cases, the qualitative results support the theory.
The probability of sale also decreased when reserve prices were imposed.  As shown in Table 1,
all cards were sold in the auctions without minimum bids (Auctions AA and BA).  When nonzero
reserve prices were imposed (Auctions AR and BR), the number of cards sold declined from 86 to
47, and from 78 to 74, respectively.   The thin bidder pool in experiment A coincided with a rela-
tively high number of unsold cards when minimum bids were imposed, in Auction AR.  Thus, re-
serve prices decreased the probability of sale, as predicted by the theory, and this effect was greater
when the number of potential bidders was small.
The between-card auctions allow me to measure how these auction outcomes vary with differ-
ent levels of the reserve price.  In assigning reserve prices to each of the cards up for auction, I
chose some to be at 10 percent of Cloister value, some at 20 percent, and so on up to 150 percent
of Cloister value.  One may think of the cards as having been assigned to one of ﬁfteen discrete
“bins,” each of which represents a different reserve level.31  There are at least 16 observations in- 19 - - 19 -
each bin, so it is possible to estimate the number of bidders and the probability of sale as a non-
parametric function of the reserve price r, by regressing the auction outcome variable on a set of
bin dummies (denoted by RESBIN1 through RESBIN15).  In the absence of other regressors, this
would be equivalent to computing the mean of the dependent variable in each of the ﬁfteen bins.
These regressions also include as control variables the Cloister value of each card (CLOISTER)
and a set of dummy variables (R1, R2, R3, R4)32 for the four auctions.33  The results of the regres-
sions are reported in Table 5.  The dependent variables are NUMBIDS, the number of bids received
on a given card, and SOLD, an indicator variable for whether the auction resulted in a sale or not.
The results for NUMBIDS conﬁrm that the number of bids is a monotonically decreasing func-
tion of the reserve price level, particularly for reserve prices between 10 percent and 70 percent of
Cloister value.  The coefﬁcients decline from 9.8 at a reserve price of 10 percent down to 1.0 at a
reserve price of 70 percent.34 At higher reserve-price levels, all bin coefﬁcients have point esti-
mates less than 1.0 and are insigniﬁcantly different from each other at the 5-percent level of signif-
icance.  The slope of n(r) is negative, as predicted.35
The empirical probability of sale similarly is a decreasing function of the reserve-price level.
The results of a least-squares linear-probability model, with SOLD as the dependent variable, are
reported in   Table 5.36  The table shows that the base probability of sale is indeed decreasing in the
reserve price, from 0.95 for the 10 percent reserve bin to 0.49 for the 140 percent reserve bin.  The
31  When rounding was necessary in order to satisfy my requirement that all minimum bids be in even multi-
ples of 5 cents, I always chose to round down to the nearest nickel.  Thus, in practice the 10-percent bin contains
cards whose reserve prices were less than or equal to 10 percent of Cloister value, the 20-percent bin contains cards
whose reserve prices were between 10 percent and 20 percent of Cloister value, and so on.
32  Auction dummy R4 is the omitted category in the regression results.
33  The Cloister value is relevant if, for example, the $10 cards attract more bidder interest than the ﬁfty-cent
cards.  The auction dummies are potentially relevant because of the simultaneous auction of sets of cards; for ex-
ample, an auction with ten $10 cards might attract more bidders than an auction with only six $10 cards, so that
the same ﬁfty-cent card might attract more bidders if it were included in the former auction than in the latter.
34  When CLOISTER is evaluated at its mean value, this indicates that in the base auction R4, there are an
average of 10.7 bidders at reserve levels of 10 percent, and 2.1 bidders at reserve levels of 70 percent.- 20 - - 20 -
decline in the coefﬁcient point estimates is not monotonic in the reserve price, but the standard er-
rors are large enough that one cannot reject for any pairwise comparison of bins (except one37) the
hypothesis that the larger reserve price bin has a coefﬁcient less than or equal to the coefﬁcient for
the bin at the smaller reserve price.  The coefﬁcients on the ﬁrst four bins are pairwise signiﬁcantly
greater than the coefﬁcients on the last four bins, indicating a decline in the probability of sale as
the reserve price increases.38
5.2 Auction revenue conditional on sale
Next, I consider the theory’s prediction that reserve prices increase revenue on those goods that
are actually sold,39 beginning with the within-card experiments.  Table 1 contains a row labeled
“Revenue from twice-sold cards,” which reports the total revenue earned on the set of cards sold in
both auctions.  In both experiments, the cards sold under reserve prices earned more than their
matches did in the absence of reserve prices. In card set A the aggregate difference was $44.85,
while in card set B it was $25.55.  Examining the percentage difference between a card’s revenue
35  The Cloister value of the card also has a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, indicating that more bidder
interest is generated by more expensive cards.  This makes sense for a market in which the transaction cost of pur-
chasing a $10 card is a negligibly small fraction of the card value, but where the 32-cent cost of mailing a check
for a 50-cent card may discourage bidder interest.  The coefﬁcients on the auction dummies indicate that that Auc-
tions R1 and R2 had signiﬁcantly more participation than did Auctions R3 and R4.  This may reﬂect the fact that
the average reserve prices in the ﬁrst two auctions were lower than in the latter two auctions.  That is, bidders ap-
pear to have been more likely to bid in on a particular card set if there were more potential bargains available.
In another speciﬁcation, not reported here, I added a set of interaction terms that allowed the coefﬁcient on
Cloister value to be different for each reserve-price bin level.  The results were qualitatively the same as in the
speciﬁcation reported in Table 5, with the additional result that the Cloister value signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the num-
ber of bidders only when the reserve price level is low.  The interaction coefﬁcients were positive and statistically
signiﬁcant (at the 5-percent level) only for RESBIN1 through RESBIN6, but insigniﬁcantly different from zero
for RESBIN7 through RESBIN15.  Thus, a valuable card at a low reserve price attracted more bids than does a
cheap card at a low reserve price, but the same was not necessarily true at high reserve prices.
36  In addition to the linear-probability model, I also tried a probit speciﬁcation.  The probit had the disadvan-
tage that I was unable to identify a full set bin-dummy coefﬁcients, because some of the bins contained no unsold
cards and therefore their indicator variables were perfectly correlated with SOLD.  Instead of including a full set
of dummy variables, I included the normalized reserve-price level  as a single regressor.  The results were quali-
tatively the same as in the linear-probability model, as the reserve-price level had a coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly less
than zero at the 5-percent level.
37  The exception is bin 15, which despite having extremely high reserve prices of 150 percent of Cloister val-
ue, had a large number of sold cards (12 of 18).  See the end of section 5.3 for a discussion of this anomaly.- 21 - - 21 -
in the reserve auction and its revenue in the absolute auction, I ﬁnd its mean to be statistically sig-
niﬁcantly greater than zero for the set of twice-sold cards (t=5.4 for card set A, t=3.3 for card set B).
Additional evidence comes from the between-card experiments.  Table 7 displays the results of
a nonparametric (binned) regression again conﬁrming the hypothesis that the revenue conditional
on sale is an increasing function of the reserve price.40  The dependent variable is REV2CLO, the
auction revenue normalized by the Cloister value of that card; the sample is restricted to those 345
cards (out of a total of 396) whose auctions resulted in sale.  The point estimates do not always
increase monotonically, but the standard errors are large enough that for any pair of bins, one can-
not reject the hypothesis that the bin with the larger reserve price has a larger revenue coefﬁcient
than the bin with the smaller reserve price.  By contrast, one can reject each of the pairwise hypoth-
eses that the coefﬁcient on any one of the four largest reserve bins is less than or equal to the coef-
ﬁcient on any of the four smallest reserve bins.  This veriﬁes that, as predicted, a higher reserve
price trades off a decreased number of bids and decreased probability of sale in exchange for higher
revenues conditional on sale.
5.3 Unconditional expected auction revenue
Now I consider the effects of reserve prices on overall auction revenue, unconditional on sale.
This is a topic of considerable empirical importance for auctioneers.  In within-card experiment A
(Antiquities cards), the minimum bids had a negative effect on revenue (see Table 1).  Auction rev-
38  The control variables produced results qualitatively the same as in the NUMBIDS speciﬁcation, though
the relative standard errors are larger in the SOLD speciﬁcation.  CLOISTER again had a positive, statistically
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient.  The point estimates indicated auctions R1 and R2 yielding higher probabilities of sale than
R3 and R4, but this time the difference was not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
39  This is another basic prediction that might be expected in other bidding models besides Nash equilibrium,
but it is by no means a tautology.  For example, a zero-reserve auction for a card might generate $10 in revenue,
while an auction with a $5 reserve for the same card might generate only $8.
40  The regressors are the same as those in the previous subsection.  Besides the reserve-price bin dummies,
the only other statistically signiﬁcant regression coefﬁcient is that for the dummy variable for Auction R1, which
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enue per card was $3.40 without minimum bids, but only $2.73 with minimum bids, and the dif-
ference is highly signiﬁcant (t=-5.27).  However, in experiment B (the Arabian Nights cards), min-
imum bids had a slight positive effect, causing revenue per card to rise from $9.93 to $10.05, which
is not statistically signiﬁcant (t=1.03).  The inconsistency between the two experiments may be due
to the ordering of the auctions.  In each experiment, the revenue was higher in the ﬁrst auction in
the pair, suggesting that demand for the second copy of any given card may be lower than demand
for the ﬁrst copy.  Also, more bidders were invited to experiment B than experiment A, so the result
is also consistent with the theoretical prediction that reserve prices should have less of an effect on
auction revenues as the number of participating bidders increases.  (The difference is negative and
signiﬁcant with fewer invited bidders, but positive and insigniﬁcant when more invited bidders.)
The evidence overall indicates that reserve prices in the within-card experiments had some ten-
dency to reduce auction revenues.41  What could have caused this effect?  One possible explanation
is that I might have set the reserve prices suboptimally high.  Since the parameters (such as the dis-
tribution of valuations) required to compute the optimal reserve price for each card were unknown
to me, this is certainly possible.42  Theoretically, when reserve prices are set too high they screen
out even the highest-valuation bidder in an auction, so imposing too-high reserve prices could de-
crease revenue by causing many cards to go unsold.  This could account for the lower experimental
revenue raised in the presence of reserve prices.  On the other hand, I tried to choose my reserve
41  The two t-statistics reported in the previous paragraph are independent standard-normal random variables,
so their sum is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance 2.  Therefore, to test the joint null hypothesis
that revenues are equal across auction formats, an appropriate standard-normal test statistic is the sum of the two
t-statistics divided by the square root of 2.  That aggregate test statistic is t=-2.99 in this case, indicating that re-
serve prices had a statistically signiﬁcantly negative effect on revenues.
42  After spending months observing this market environment and after running auctions myself, it is hard for
me to imagine how an auctioneer in a real-word environment could ever have enough information to choose pre-
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prices to be similar in level to those used by other auctioneers in this market, which casts some
doubt on the explanation that my reserve prices were too high.43
The between-card experiments allow me to trace out the entire shape of the expected-revenue
curve, rather than merely sampling it in two places.  I regress the normalized revenue per card,
REV2CLO, on the reserve-price bin dummies and the control variables used previously.  The re-
sults are reported in Table 7.  The major features of the results are that the expected revenue starts
at approximately 80 percent of Cloister value for low (20 to 50 percent) reserve price levels, in-
creases to approximately 100 percent of Cloister value for intermediate (80 to 110 percent) reserve
price levels, and then declines back down to approximately 90 percent of Cloister value for very
high (120 to 140 percent) reserve price levels.  The additional control variables (Cloister value, auc-
tion dummies) all turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant.44  The empirical expected revenue curve,
R(r), as given by the reserve-price-bin regression coefﬁcients, is plotted in Figure 8, with error bars
representing the standard errors of the coefﬁcients.  The mean normalized revenue per card is sta-
tistically signiﬁcantly higher in the middle of the curve, for cards with reserves of 80 to 110 percent
(118 observations), than for cards at the left of the curve, with reserves of 10 to 50 percent (166
observations, t=3.13), and not quite signiﬁcantly higher than for cards at reserves of 120 to 150 per-
cent, at the right of the curve (72 observations, t=1.80).  
How does this curve compare with the revenue curve predicted by the theory?  It is difﬁcult to
test the general theory here,  because the shape of the revenue curve depends on the shape of the
value distribution F(v), which is unobserved in the experiment.45   For example, a multimodal dis-
tribution F(v) can lead to a revenue curve with more than one local optimum.  Since auction theo-
43  Some auctioneers chose to run absolute auctions, with zero minimum bid, but those auctions with nonzero
minimum bids tended to be around 90 percent of Cloister value on average.
44  An additional speciﬁcation, not reported here, also included a set of interaction terms between the reserve-
bin dummies and the Cloister price, but none of these coefﬁcients proved to be statistically signiﬁcant, nor did they
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rists sometimes assume a monotone hazard rate condition on F(v) for convenience, we can check
that assumption by asking whether revenue curve is nondecreasing for all reserve prices less than
the optimal one (just as in the examples plotted in Figures 2 and 4).  The data suggest that this pre-
diction may be violated, as the point estimates of expected revenue actually decline from reserve
prices of 10 percent to reserve prices of 40 percent.  However, this decline is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant; one cannot reject the hypothesis that the revenue curve is ﬂat over the ﬁrst four bins
(F=1.02).  Still, the downward slope indicated by the point estimates is intriguing; additional data
would be useful.  Perhaps very low reserve prices might attract more participation (relative to mod-
erate reserve prices) even by high-value bidders, which would translate into increased revenues.46
Note that at a reserve level of 150 percent of Cloister price, the mean revenues are very high: a
normalized revenue value of 1.17, compared with a value of 0.81 at a reserve price of 140 percent.
(At a reserve price of 150 percent, only 6 of 18 cards went unsold, compared with 9 of 16 cards at
140 percent.)  This would indicate that the revenue curve R(r) has two local maxima, and that the
optimal reserve price is actually at 150 percent or more of the Cloister value.  However, this differ-
ence is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.  Post-experiment interviews revealed that
45  A laboratory experiment would obviously result in a cleaner test, because it could control the distribution
of bidder values.  The point of this ﬁeld experiment is not to do a formal test, but  to explore the empirical revenue
curve for an unknown real-world distribution of values.  Though different cards might well have very different
value distributions, this empirical exercise is to look for the optimal reserve price as a fraction of book value, on
average for these cards.
46  In Riley and Samuelson, the number of potential bidders is ﬁxed at some exogenous number N, and the
reserve price reduces the number of actual bidders only by screening out the low-valuation bidders who wouldn’t
have contributed much to auction revenue anyway.   But perhaps minimum bids also have some probability of
eliminating even high-valuation bidders, at the time of the bidder’s entry decision (the decision of whether or not
to prepare a bid at all).  This idea can be found in more recent models with endogenous entry of bidders, such as
those of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987, 1992) and McAfee and McMillan (1987b).  In such a model,  eliminating
minimum bids altogether could conceivably be a proﬁt-maximizing strategy for the auctioneer (particularly if his
outside option value for the good is low).  A no-minimum strategy would, of course, open up the possibility for
losses on some goods, but if an auction is advertised as having zero minimum bids, then it may induce more bid-
ders to participate.  Thus, although a few items may end up being sold at very low prices, they mmight serve as
“loss leaders,” similar to the goods advertised at deep discounts by supermarkets, enabling the auctioneer to collect
higher revenues overall.  Though I have no deﬁnitive empirical evidence, I see it as an interesting possibility for
future research.- 25 - - 25 -
at least one bidder used the minimum bid levels as approximate signals of the cards’ value; this
could explain why cards continued to sell even at such high reserve prices.  It would be interesting
to know whether some bidders consistently behave in this manner, in violation the standard theory
of rational bidding.
5.4 Strategic bidding behavior
The most interesting results of this paper concern the levels of individual bids.  Recall that in
the theoretical model,   for a bidder with v>r.  This implies that if a bidder’s valuation is high
enough to induce him to participate in both auctions for the same card, he will  (for strategic rea-
sons) bid strictly higher in the auction with the higher reserve price.  This prediction is borne out
in the bid data reported in Figures 5 and 6, which show the distributions of the bid amounts received
in the four within-card auction treatments. One can see that imposing reserve prices does not raise
bid levels merely to the level of the reserve, but rather above the level of the reserve, just as pre-
dicted.  Imposing reserve prices at the 90 percent level consistently increases the number of bids
placed at levels of 100, 110, 120, and even 130 percent of Cloister value.
A more quantitative look at these data appears in Table 3.  A total of 2,457 individual bids were
placed on the cards in the four auctions.  Of these, 2,148 occurred in the no-minimum auctions;
309 occurred in the auctions with reserve prices.  Although the total number of bids was lower in
the presence of reserve prices, the number of bids exceeding 90 percent of Cloister value was great-
er in the presence of reserve prices.  Reserve prices appear to have caused some bidders to increase
their bids above the amounts they would have chosen in an absolute auction.  The total number of
bids equal to the reserve price increased from 7 to 69 when reserve prices were added, and the num-
ber strictly greater than the reserve price increased from 162 to 240.  This increase in the number
of bids strictly greater than the reserve price strongly supports the theory’s prediction that   for
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bidders whose valuation is greater than the reserve.  To see this, consider a bidder who values a
card at more than 90 percent of its Cloister price, but who in an absolute auction decides that his
optimal bid is less than 90 percent of Cloister value.  In the change from an absolute auction to an
auction with minimum bids, a naive bidder might choose to raise his bid exactly to the level of the
reserve price.  A rational bidder, however, will take into account the strategic consideration that
there is some probability that other bidders might also raise their bids in the presence of reserve
prices, and will thus raise his bid to a level strictly greater than the reserve price.  The data indicate
that the strategic considerations identiﬁed by the theory are relevant to real-world bidding behavior.
On the other hand, the increase in the number of bids exactly equal to the reserve price (from
7 in the absolute auctions to 69 in the reserve auctions) seems inconsistent with the theory.  The bid
function (1) implies that only a bidder with valuation v=r should bid exactly the reserve price,
which is an event of probability zero if the distribution of valuations is continuous.  The discrete-
ness of acceptable bids is one possible explanation for the increase in the number of bids at the re-
serve level.  Since the auctions required bids to be even multiples of $0.05, a bidder who wished to
bid one penny over the minimum, for example, would have been forced instead to bid exactly at
the minimum.  However, this explanation is unlikely to be the whole story, because most of the re-
serve-price bids were large compared to the bid increment of $0.05.  Only 25 of the 69 bids were
for amounts less than $2.50, so the vast majority of reserve-price bids were at least 50 times the
amount of the bid increment.  The median reserve-price bid was $6.60, with several bids at large
odd amounts such $16.45, $39.95 , and $40.10.  This likely indicates that some bidders behaved
naively regarding reserve prices.  Of the 46 unique47 bidders in auctions AR and BR, 18 submitted
47  Three bidders bid in both auctions AR and BR.- 27 - - 27 -
at least one bid equal to the reserve.48  Despite the violations by some bidders, most of the bidders
tended to bid strictly above the reserve price in the reserve auctions.
I also compare the pairs of bids of those bidders who bid on both copies of the same card  Four
bidders submitted a total of 22 such pairs of bids in experiment A, and 17 bidders submitted 88
such pairs of bids on cards in experiment B.  The data are displayed in Figure 7, where the right
tail clearly contains much more mass than the left tail of the distribution.  The mean difference be-
tween reserve-auction bids and absolute-auction bids, as a fraction of the posted reserve price, was
a statistically signiﬁcant 14.88% (t=4.58).49  Of the 110 observations where the same bidder bid
on the same card in both auctions, 70 of them had higher bids in the presence of reserve prices,50
35 were lower under reserve prices, and 5 were exactly the same in the two auctions.51  The bids
that were lower in the presence of reserve prices are a bit difﬁcult to explain.  Some may be ac-
counted for by random bidding errors or random changes in bidders’ valuations, but a few bidders
systematically bid perversely: 3 of the 21 bidders accounted for 21 of the 35 aberrant observations.
48  Only seven bidders had all their bids exactly equal to the reserve: one with nineteen bids, one with six bids,
and ﬁve bidders with one bid each.  The other eleven bidders had only some of their bids at the reserve: 13 of 31
bids, 11 of 30 bids, 8 of 9 bids, 2 of 8 bids, 1 of 4 bids, and so on.  For those bidders who submitted both types of
bids, the reserve bids were for lower amounts (mean $4.72, standard error $0.92, 40 bids) than the above-reserve
bids (mean $8.58, standard error $1.14, 64 bids) to be for lower amounts while the above-reserve bids tended to
be for higher amounts, indicating that bid-increment rounding probably affected these bids.
Only nine of the bidders submitted more than half of their bids above the reserve (and six of these submitted
only a single bid observation).  These nine bidders appear indeed to have been behaving naively.  It is possible that
they were used to bidding in English auctions rather than sealed-bid auctions, and therefore bid at the minimum
bid amount because they expected to have the opportunity to raise their rivals’ bids later.
49  This t-statistic assumes independence of all 110 observations.  A much more conservative approach is to
assume that each bidder generates only one independent observation.  Taking each bidder’s mean difference to be
the unit of observation and equally weighting each bidder, I ﬁnd that the overall mean difference falls to 7.2%, and
the t-statistic falls to only 1.22, no longer statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.  However, this approach ignores
a considerable amount of statistical information.  The reader is left to decide which test seems more appropriate.
50  Of the 70 increases described above, it turns out that 28 increased up to the level of the reserve price, while
42 increased to a level strictly greater than the reserve price.  The 42 bids provide additional evidence in favor of
strategic bidding behavior, while the 28 may be due to minimum bid increments or due to naive bidding.
51  By making the (questionable) assumption that all 110 observations are independent, I can reject the null
hypothesis the bid difference is equally likely to be positive as negative (z=2.97).- 28 - - 28 -
Thus, most individual bidders in the within-card auctions behaved consistently with the theoretical
prediction, bidding higher in the presence of a reserve price.
Table 6 reports relevant data from the between-card experiments.  Each row denotes a reserve
price bin (0.1 through 1.5 times Cloister value); the number of cards per bin ranges from 16 to 39.
Each column denotes a reference bid level; the cells of the table report the average number, per
card, of bids greater or equal to this reference level.  For example, the ﬁrst cell of the table shows
that for cards with a reserve price level of 0.1 (that is, 10 percent of Cloister value), there were an
average of 11.4 bids received per card auctioned.  The cell immediately to the right excludes bids
which were less than 20 percent of Cloister value; here the average number of bids falls to 9.7, im-
plying that just under 2 of 11 bids on average for these cards fell between 10 percent and 20 percent
of Cloister value.  The next cell on the right shows that the number of bids per card falls to 6.8 if
bids less than 30 percent of Cloister value are excluded, and so on.  Cells on the diagonal of the
table show the total number of bids greater than or equal to the reserve price, while cells to the right
of the diagonal show the number of bids greater than or equal to even higher levels.
Within any given column of Table 6, the number of bids received turns out to be an increasing
function of the reserve price employed in the auction.  For example, in the “bids >=0.4” column,
we see that the number of bids received at levels greater than or equal to 40 percent of Cloister price
increases as the reserve price increases.  There are 4.4 such bids received per card auctioned at a
reserve price of 0.1, 4.8 bids per card at a reserve price of 0.2, 6.2 bids per card at a reserve price
of 0.3, and 9.1 bids per card at a reserve price of 0.4.  This is consistent with the sort of strategic
behavior predicted by the theory: the reserve price can cause bidders to raise their bids even when
the reserve is not binding.  For example, raising the reserve price from 0.2 to 0.3 increases not only
the number of bids submitted at prices of 0.3, but also the number of bids at prices of 0.4 (in this- 29 - - 29 -
case, from 4.8 bids to 6.2 bids on average).  This phenomenon is generally true down each of the
columns of the table, although the effect appears only in the last several rows of each column.  For
example, increasing the reserve price from 0.2 to 0.3 has very little effect on the number of bids
submitted at levels of 1.5 or more, just as changes in the reserve price have very little effect on the
rightmost sections of the theoretical bid functions in Figures 1 and 3.
These differences in the empirical bid distribution appear to be statistically signiﬁcant for the
most part, though it is not clear what the single best summary statistic should be.  For example, in
comparing auctions with a reserve price of 0.1 to auctions with a reserve price of 1.0, the number
of bids greater than or equal to 1.1 increases from 0.333 to 1.179 bids per card, which is a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference (t = 3.318).  For each different column of the table, one can similarly
compare the ﬁrst row to the next-to-last row, and ﬁnd that the point estimate of the difference is
always positive (that is, the number of bids greater than or equal to X is always higher with a high
reserve price, of just under X, than it is for a low reserve price, of 0.1).  These differences are indi-
vidually statistically signiﬁcant for each of columns 0.5 through 1.2, with t-statistics ranging from
2.73 to 4.48.  In columns 0.3 and 0.4, the differences are statisically insigniﬁcant (t=0.68 and 1.63,
respectively), because small reserve prices have relatively small effects on the magnitudes of large
bids.52  In columns 1.3 and 1.4, the differences are again individually insigniﬁcant (t=1.49 and
1.36), because  very few bids can be generated at levels of 1.3 or 1.4 times Cloister price or more,
no matter how high the reserve.53  Thus, every column of the table indicates point estimates con-
sistent with the type of strategic bidding behavior predicted by the theory, with statistically signif-
52  This is predicted by the theory.  See, for example, equation 3.
53  Furthermore, the experimental design generated fewer observations for reserve prices greater than 1.1,
which also increases the standard errors of these estimates of the mean number of bids.  Note, however, that the
difference in column 1.5 turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant (t=2.19), indicating signiﬁcantly higher numbers
of bids of at least 1.5 times Cloister price when r=1.4 than when r=0.1.- 30 - - 30 -
icant differences for the vast majority of columns (particularly those where the theory would pre-
dict the observed differences to be greatest).54
Just as in the within-card experiments, the between-card experiments also generated a substan-
tial amount of bidding exactly equal to the reserve price.  Of a total of 2217 bids submitted in the
four auctions, 563 were exactly equal to the posted reserve price; these bids were submitted by 50
of the 119 unique participating bidders.  Twenty of the bidders had more than half of their submit-
ted bids equal to the reserve price.  In these auctions, there were more low card values than in the
within-card experiments: 358 of the 563 reserve-price bids were for amounts less than $2.50, indi-
cating that some of this reserve-price bidding may have been due to rounding to the nearest bid in-
crement.  Overall, the evidence from the experiments suggests that while some bidders react naive-
ly to reserve prices, the majority of bidders behave strategically, as predicted.
6 Conclusion
This study presents the results of controlled experimental auctions performed in a ﬁeld envi-
ronment.  By auctioning real goods in a preexisting, natural auction market, I have combined the
experimental methods of the laboratory with the real-world environment of traditional IO ﬁeld
studies.  Not every variable could be observed (for example, I could not assign “valuations” for
each good to each bidder, as a laboratory experimentalist might), but I did hold constant all of the
relevant variables in the environment except for the treatment variable, which in this case was the
54  An aggregate test of all thirteen point estimates being jointly equal to zero would have much higher power
than any of the individual tests.  Such a test would almost certainly reject the null, given that each of the point
estimates had the same sign.  Unfortunately, I do not know how to compute a valid aggregate test statistic.  If each
of the thirteen t-statistics were an independent standard-normal random variable (see footnote 41), an aggregate
standard-normal test statistic would equal the average of the thirteen t-statistics multiplied by the square root of
thirteen, which in this case would yield an enormous value of t=10.16.  However, this procedure is not strictly val-
id, because these t-statistics are not in fact independent (while the rows of Table 6 are independent of each other,
the columns within a row are not, and each individual test involves subtracting an observation in the ﬁrst row).- 31 - - 31 -
existence and level of reserve prices.  By giving up the ability to observe and manipulate some of
variables that laboratory experimenters can control, I gained a very realistic environment, akin to
the ﬁeld data traditionally used by empirical economists.  The transactions which took place in this
experiment were unquestionably real economic transactions.
The ﬁrst result of this paper is that auction theory accurately predicts a number of important
features of the data.  Holding all else constant, implementing reserve prices (1) reduces the number
of bidders, (2) increases the frequency with which goods go unsold, and (3) increases the revenues
received on the goods conditional on their having been sold.  Second, the empirical shape of the
expected revenue curve is roughly consistent with examples from the theory.  Some intriguing po-
tential anomalies appear both at low reserve prices and at high reserve prices, but neither is statis-
tically signiﬁcant in this data set.  Finally, perhaps the most subtle and interesting result is that bid-
ders appear to behave strategically in the presence of reserve prices, just as predicted by the theory.
Though a few bidders appear to react naively to reserve prices, most high-value bidders apparently
raise their bids to be strictly above the reserve, as if they correctly anticipates that rival bidders will
also raise their bids in the presence of posted minimums.
This paper suggests some interesting lines of research.  First, it would be useful to reproduce
these experiments in a laboratory setting, where bidder valuations can be observed and controlled.
Second, it would be useful to experiment with the number of invited bidders as a treatment variable.
Riley and Samuelson (1981) predict that the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of
potential bidders N, while Samuelson (1985) and Levin and Smith (1996) predict that the optimal
reserve declines with N.55  By manipulating the number of invited bidders as a treatment variable,
an experiment could investigate this and other questions about the different effects of reserve prices
in thick versus thin markets.- 32 - - 32 -
I am optimistic that the ﬁeld-experiment methodology described in this paper will be useful in
other areas of research.  The general concept is that rather than relying solely on ﬁeld data, which
typically do not have the variation needed to test the economic theories of interest, economists can
run their own businesses with the intent of collecting data on the effects of different decisions (such
as the decision to employ reserve prices in auctions).  Field experiments can complement both ﬁeld
data and laboratory experiments, and with the development of electronic markets for goods and ser-
vices, some types of ﬁeld experiments can generate detailed data at relatively low cost.
55  The results of the present paper provide some weak evidence against all three of these theories.  In the
within-card experiment, it appeared that 90% of Cloister value was higher than optimal, particularly for the exper-
iment (A) with the lower number of invited bidders.  By contrast, the between-card experiments, with a large num-
ber of invited bidders, had an empirically optimal reserve in the range of 80% to 110% of Cloister price.  One
possible interpretation is that the optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders.  However, these
results are merely suggestive, and not at all conclusive (for example, the experiments took place at very different
points in time).  A new experiment could be designed to provide a much cleaner test of this hypothesis.- 33 - - 33 -
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For the case N=2:
For the case N=5:
The solid lines represent the r=0 case, while the broken lines represent r=0.5.
Figure 1: Bid functions for the uniform distribution:- 36 - - 36 -
Figure 2: Revenue curve for the uniform distribution.
The N=2 case is a black curve, while the N=5 case is a gray one:
Vertical close-up of the optimum for N=5:- 37 - - 37 -
Figure 3: Bid functions for the exponential distribution.
For the case N=2:
For the case N=5:
The solid lines represent the r=0 case, while the broken lines represent r=1.- 38 - - 38 -
Figure 4: Revenue curves for the exponential distribution.
The N=2 case is a black curve, while the N=5 case is a gray one:- 39 - - 39 -
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eTable 1:  Summary statistics for within-card experiments.
Auction AA Auction AR Auction BA Auction BR
Minimum bids? No Yes No Yes
Card set Antiquities Antiquities Arabian Nights Arabian Nights
Start date Fri, 24 Feb Fri, 10 Mar Tue, 14 Mar Tue, 28 Feb
End date Fri, 3 Mar Fri, 17 Mar Tue, 21 Mar Tue, 7 Mar
Number of items for auction 86 86 78 78
Number of items sold 86 47 78 74
Revenue from twice-sold cards $189.90 $234.75 $758.25 $783.80
Total auction revenue $292.40 $234.75 $774.75 $783.80
Total number of bids 565 71 1583 238
Total number of bidders 19 7 62 42
  from email invitations 12 5 46 35
  from newsgroup announcements 7 2 18 7
Number of email invitations sent 52 50 232 234
Number of winners 15 6 25 27
Winner/bidder ratio 78.9% 85.7% 40.3% 64.3%
Cards per winner:
  Max 25 26 12 18
    as share of total 29.1% 55.3% 15.4% 24.3%
  Min 1 1 1 1
  Mean 5.7 7.8 3.1 2.7
  Median 3 3.5 2 2
Payment per winner:
  Max $70.00 $129.40 $316.50 $128.00
    as share of total 23.9% 55.1% 40.9% 16.3%
  Min $3.00 $0.70 $1.05 $2.55
  Mean $19.49 $39.13 $30.99 $29.03
  Median $10.50 $23.68 $13.15 $13.00Table 2:  Bids received in the within-card auctions.
Auction AA Auction AR Auction BA Auction BR
Minimum bids? No Yes No Yes
Card set Antiquities Antiquities Arabian Nights Arabian Nights
Number of bidders 19 7 62 42
Number of items for auction 86 86 78 78
Number of bids per bidder:
  Mean 29.7 10.1 25.5 5.7
  Median 13.0 4.0 14.0 4.0
  Max 86.0 29.0 78.0 30.0
  Min 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 3:  Comparison of submitted bid levels to the minimum bid levels.









    Auction AA 531 5 29 565
    Auction AR 0 10 61 71
    Auction BA 1448 2 133 1583
    Auction BR 0 59 179 238
  Total in absolute auctions 1979 7 162 2148
  Total in reserve-price auctions 0 69 240 309









Card set Artifacts Black White Blue
Start date Tue, 3 Oct Fri, 6 Oct Fri, 20 Oct Mon, 23 Oct
End date Tue, 10 Oct Fri, 13 Oct Fri, 27 Oct Mon, 30 Oct
Number of items for auction 99 99 99 99
Number of items sold 98 92 77 78
Mean reserve level 60% 60% 85% 81%
Total number of bids 798 652 366 401
Total number of bidders 57 55 46 38
Number of email invitations sent 532 523 512 489
Total Cloister value 345.83 271.55 285.87 224.89
Total auction revenue 338.45 282.65 260.95 219.25
Revenue plus salvage 343.94 283.65 269.48 224.52Table 5:  Least-squares regressions of number of bids and probability of sale, 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Table 7:  Least-squares regression of normalized revenues (REV2CLO), both 
conditional and unconditional on sale.
















































































Number of observations 345 396Appendix.  A Sample Auction Announcement.
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 1995 18:19:10 -0500
To: reiley@MIT.EDU (David Reiley)
From: reiley@MIT.EDU (David Reiley)
Subject: Reiley's Auction #5: ARABIANS, Free Shipping!
Hi!  As a participant in one of my previous auctions, I thought you might
be interested in this NEW AUCTION opportunity.
---------
Please read the rules of this auction carefully, as each auction I run
typically has a different set of rules.
This will be a SEALED-BID, FIRST-PRICE AUCTION.  Here's how it works:
I will accept all bids up until the deadline of NOON (Eastern Standard Time),
next TUESDAY, March 7, 1995.  All bids are "sealed" in the sense that I will
not post updates or otherwise reveal information about the highest bid until the
auction is over.
After the deadline for bids has passed, I will award each card to the highest
bidder at the price of their bid.  The exception is that if no one bid at least
the posted minimum bid for some card, that card will not be sold.
Note that SHIPPING IS INCLUDED in the bid price.  If you win, you mail me
exactly the amount of your bid, with no extra charges.  This is to encourage
everyone to bid separately on each card they're interested in - no worrying
about having to win multiple cards in order to make it worth your while.
Here are THE RULES:
1. Submit bids via email to <reiley@mit.edu>.  Make sure that the subject
line of your email contains the phrase "Auction #5".  (Simply using the "reply"
command on most mail and news programs should work just fine.)  If your message
does not contain this text in the subject line, your message will be discarded.
2. In your email message, please put each of your bids on a separate line
of text.
Each bid line should be in the following format: the 3-digit identification
number
of the card you're bidding on, immediately followed by a right parenthesis, and
then the amount of your bid in dollars and cents (such as 1.00).  For example:
 305) 2.00
 306) 0.65
Including extra information on the bid line is okay, too.  Such extra
information might include email quote marks (such as the greater-than symbol),
the card name, condition, etc.  You may include anything that makes bidding
easier for you, EXCEPT that your bid amount should be the only price-formatted
number which appears on that line.  In other words, no other number containing a
decimal point should appear on that line.
For example, the following are also perfectly valid bids:
 > 305) Ghosts of the Damned             U1     Blk   M  2.00
 > 306) Demonic Torment   0.65
Bids that do not conform to these rules will be discarded.
Here are examples of INVALID bids:
 >305) Ghosts of the Damned      $2                       [no decimal point]
 306 ) Demonic Torment 0.65  [space between the 6 and the right parenthesis]3. All bids must be in integer multiples of a nickel ($0.05), in US currency.
5. The auction closes on Tuesday, March 7, 1995, at noon (EST).  Any bids
received after that time will be ignored.  All cards receiving a bid of at
least the posted minimum bid will be sold at that point to the highest bidder.
In the case of a tie, the winner will be the person whose bid was received
first.
6. The winning bidder will be notified by email, and will be asked to pay the
amount of his/her bid via US check or money order.
7. This payment will include free shipping within the United States, via first
class mail.  The cards will be wrapped in plastic sheaths and packed in
cardboard for protection.  All cards will be shipped within one week after
the receipt of payment.
8. While this is a real auction for real cards, you should know that I plan
to use data on the bids in this auction for economic research.  In no case
will individual bidders be identified in this research; anonymity will be
preserved. By bidding in this auction, you indicate your consent to have
your bid be used in economic research.  If you do not approve of this, you
have the right not to participate in this auction.  Should you have any
questions or concerns about the use of data from this auction in academic
research, please contact the chair of the COUHES committee at MIT by phone
at 617-253-6787.
That's it!  Enjoy the auction.  Good luck, and thanks for participating!
Here is the LIST OF CARDS:
ID   Card Name                   Rarity Color Cond  Minimum
501) Bazaar of Baghdad           U3     Lnd   M       8.90
502) City of Brass               U3     Lnd   M      17.85
503) Desert                      C11    Lnd   M       3.55
504) Diamond Valley              U2     Lnd   M      26.40
505) Elephant Graveyard          U2     Lnd   M      18.30
506) Island of Wak-Wak           U2     Lnd   M      20.10
507) Library of Alexandria       U3     Lnd   M      21.00
508) Mountain                    C1     Lnd   M       2.45
509) Oasis                       U4     Lnd   M       5.65
510) Aladdin's Lamp              U2     Art   M       3.10
511) Aladdin's Ring              U2     Art   M       3.05
512) Bottle of Suleiman          U2     Art   M       2.75
513) Brass Man                   U3     Art   M       0.90
514) City in a Bottle            U2     Art   M      10.60
515) Dancing Scimitar            U2     Art   M       2.55
516) Ebony Horse                 U2     Art   M       3.05
517) Flying Carpet               U3     Art   M       2.95
518) Jandor's Ring               U2     Art   M       2.70
519) Jandor's Saddlebags         U2     Art   M       2.80
520) Jeweled Bird                U3     Art   M       5.40
521) Pyramids                    U2     Art   M      16.20
522) Ring of Ma'ruf              U2     Art   M      21.85
523) Sandals of Abdallah         U3     Art   M       6.30
524) Cuombajj Witches            C4     Blk   M       2.40
525) El-Hajjaj                   U2     Blk   M       2.85
526) Erg Raiders                 C5     Blk   M       0.50
527) Guardian Beast              U2     Blk   M      40.10
528) Hasran Ogress               C5     Blk   M       1.25
529) Junun Efreet                U2     Blk   M      13.50
530) Juzam Djinn                 U2     Blk   M      27.00
531) Khabal Ghoul                U3     Blk   M      21.45
532) Oubliette                   C4     Blk   M       3.75
533) Sorceress Queen             U3     Blk   M       5.05
534) Stone-Throwing Devils       C4     Blk   M       2.40
535) Dandan                      C4     Blu   M       1.50
536) Fishliver Oil               C4     Blu   M       1.55537) Flying Men                  C5     Blu   M       2.40
538) Giant Tortoise              C4     Blu   M       1.30
539) Island Fish Jasconius       U2     Blu   M       3.20
540) Merchant Ship               U3     Blu   M       6.15
541) Old Man of the Sea          U2     Blu   M      24.65
542) Serendib Djinn              U2     Blu   M       9.95
543) Serendib Efreet             U2     Blu   M       3.95
544) Sindbad                     U3     Blu   M       7.30
545) Unstable Mutation           C5     Blu   M       0.50
546) Cyclone                     U3     Gre   M       6.30
547) Desert Twister              U3     Gre   M       1.95
548) Drop of Honey               U2     Gre   M      17.50
549) Erhnam Djinn                U2     Gre   M      15.70
550) Ghazban Ogre                C4     Gre   M       1.40
551) Ifh-Biff Efreet             U2     Gre   M      16.10
552) Metamorphosis               C4     Gre   M       1.60
553) Naf's Asp                   C4     Gre   M       1.35
554) Sandstorm                   C5     Gre   M       1.85
555) Singing Tree                U2     Gre   M      20.20
556) Wyluli Wolf                 C5     Gre   M       3.30
557) Aladdin                     U2     Red   M      16.45
558) Ali Baba                    U3     Red   M       9.25
559) Ali from Cairo              U2     Red   M      39.95
560) Bird Maiden                 C4     Red   M       2.15
561) Desert Nomads               C5     Red   M       2.00
562) Hurr Jackal                 C4     Red   M       1.80
563) Kird Ape                    C5     Red   M       0.60
564) Magnetic Mountain           U3     Red   M       2.55
565) Mijae Djinn                 U2     Red   M       3.90
566) Rukh Egg                    C4     Red   M       5.85
567) Ydwen Efreet                U2     Red   M       6.60
568) Abu Ja Far                  U3     Whi   M      11.10
569) Army of Allah               C4     Whi   M       3.25
570) Camel                       C5     Whi   M       1.45
571) Eye for an Eye              U3     Whi   M       3.20
572) Jihad                       U2     Whi   M      23.00
573) King Suleiman               U2     Whi   M      11.85
574) Moorish Cavalry             C5     Whi   M       2.75
575) Piety                       C4     Whi   M       1.45
576) Repentant Blacksmith        U2     Whi   M       9.40
577) Shahrazad                   U2     Whi   M      11.95
578) War Elephant                C4     Whi   M       3.50
 END OF LIST
Key to Card Types and Conditions:
C1  = Common
C2  = Common (twice as common as C1, printed twice per common sheet)
C4  = Common (four times as common as C1, printed four times per common sheet)
C11 = Common (printed 11 times per common sheet)
U1  = Uncommon
U2  = Uncommon (twice as common as U1, printed twice per uncommon sheet)






Red = Red   :)
Whi = White
M  = Mint
NM = Near Mint (never played, but has tiny blemishes from handling)
E  = Excellent (played a few times, has small scuff marks)If you are unfamiliar with some of these cards, you can get information about




Remember to send any bids, comments, or questions about the cards or the rules
of this auction to <reiley@mit.edu>.
Thanks!